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As part of a programme of research that is developing tools to enhance choreographic practice, an
interdisciplinary team of cognitive scientists, neuroscientists and dance professionals collaborated
on two studies examining the mental representations used to support movement creation. We
studied choreographer Wayne McGregor’s approach to movement creation through tasking, in
which he asks dancers to create movement in response to task instructions that require a great
deal of mental imagery and decision making.
In our first experiment, we used experience sampling methods (self-report scales and reports
about the current focus of thought) with the full company of Wayne McGregor | Random Dance
to describe what the dancers report thinking about while creating movement, and to establish how
their experiences change as a function of different task conditions. In particular, we contrasted a
conventional ‘active’ condition (where dancers are free to move around) with a ‘static’ condition
(where they have to create movement mentally, without moving), because all neuroimaging studies
of dance require participants to lie motionless within a scanner. We adapted the static mode
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from Experiment 1 for the neuroimaging session in Experiment 2. Here we recorded the brain
activity of an experienced dancer from Wayne McGregor | Random Dance while she mentally
undertook movement creation tasks similar to those used in our experience sampling experiment.
Both studies involved imagery tasks of a primarily spatial-praxic nature (involving an imagined
object or volume that could be approached and manipulated) and imagery that focused on content
invoking emotional narratives.
In the first study, the dancers’ awareness was focused more than they had anticipated upon
conceptual rather than physical or bodily aspects. The very act of reflecting on, and categorising,
their experiences provided the dancers with insights about their mental habits during innovative
movement creation. Such insights provide conditions under which habits can be recognised and
then altered to adopt alternative points in mental space from which to create movement material.
Providing the dancers and McGregor with a means to communicate more productively about the
properties of the task-based instructions has been acknowledged by the company to be of clear
benefit and a useful addition to their working process.
In the second study we assessed the feasibility of using fMRI to study the neural
underpinnings of choreographing movement tasks. The experiment enabled us to compare brain
activity in imagery and movement creation. The data raise some key questions concerning the
mental context in which such thinking occurs and, given the clear limitations of the current
fMRI and experience sampling work, how future research might usefully be directed.
Taken together, these two exploratory studies indicate that the experiential and neural
attributes of imagery during movement creation are open to systematic investigation: innovative
movement creation can start from alternative points in mental, as well as physical, space. This
enables us to look forward to establishing with greater precision how tasks that challenge dancers
in different ways may affect mental and neural processes and how variation in imagery use
across dancers might contribute to the variety of movement creation that they produce. Notably,
the act of reflecting on the experience of movement creation also offers some practical leverage to
help dancers develop a wider range of strategies for innovation. These findings are being used to
contribute to further work informing the development of personal, notebook-like, Choreographic
Thinking Tools.
INTRODUCTION
Several renowned choreographers, such as Trisha Brown, William Forsythe,
Wayne McGregor and Merce Cunningham have explored their performers’
expressive range through developing and refining techniques for generating
and structuring novel forms of movement. This paper focuses on the mental
strategies underpinning the movement innovation techniques used by one of
these choreographers, Wayne McGregor and his company Wayne McGregor
| Random Dance. In particular, we want to understand how different forms
of mental imagery are involved in movement creation, and how different task
constraints can change the nature of the imagery that is used. We are also
concerned with the ecological validity of neuroimaging studies of choreography
in which participants must necessarily lie still in a scanner, whereas movement
creation typically combines mental and physical activity.
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Wayne McGregor’s approach to movement creation involves dancers
making a wide range of embodied mental transformations. He asks his dancers
to create movement in response to task instructions that require a great deal of
mental imagery and decision making, and then observes the dancers’ resulting
movement, selecting and amplifying sections for potential re-use. It is this process
of movement creation in response to different forms of task instruction that our
collaborative studies have set out to better understand. Comparative literature
scholar Carrie Noland in her essay on the creative process of choreographer
Merce Cunningham, invites her readers to consider ‘choreography not as an
aesthetic practice, but as the production of puzzles for the body to solve,
puzzles that require it to cope, to enact its kinesthetic and proprioceptive
capacities, in unusual and taxing conditions’ (Noland, 2009). Our paper parallels
Noland’s analysis of Cunningham: we focus on the working practices of a
single choreographer, Wayne McGregor, who also adopts a problem-solving
approach to movement creation. Where Noland departs from the framework
of dance scholarship to explore the techniques involved in Cunningham’s
process using ideas from anthropology and cognitive science, we use the
methods and conceptual framework of behavioural science, cognitive science
and neuropsychology to address the underpinnings of McGregor’s innovative
movement creation.
In common usage, mental imagery is often understood as mainly visual in
nature, but we are all able to construct mental imagery in other sensory domains:
imagining sounds, textures, tastes and smells. We can imagine movement,
without actually executing it, and it would be expected that dancers would
be especially well practiced at this form of mental imagery. Alongside sensory
imagery, we can also construct more abstract mental representations, including
emotional feelings, and highly conceptual thoughts. In our research, we seek
to understand how all of these forms of mental imagery are used to support
movement creation.
Mental imagery of all these forms pervades the content of the problems
and tasks McGregor gives his dancers, and they approach both imagery
and movement creation in the same underlying spirit of problem-solving as
Cunningham (see Kirsh et al. 2009, for a summary of McGregor’s methods).
However, unlike Cunningham’s approach, McGregor’s challenge to his dancers
is that they focus their attention on specific aspects of a mental image or images
provided in the context of the problem or task. In executing the task the dancers
are engaging in a process of movement creation in some direct correspondence
to the stimuli the task sets out. Here is one example of a McGregor task:
‘First thing to do is in your mind create a very simple, literal freehand sketch or drawing – in your mind.
Choose a beginning on that sketch and then describe it physically or draw it – the whole thing rather than
just an element of the whole thing. So it has duration. The third part of this is to discard the geometry (of
the object that you drew) and replace that with colour. Then do another one.’
This task clearly requires a lot of mental work, some obvious and some not
so obvious. It involves imagining and holding in focus a geometric spatial image
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that does not actually exist in space, and has to be internally generated. The
instruction to ‘describe or draw it’ is a suggestion of the action (with no further
directions), and the direction to replace it with colour implies a transformation
in meaning or emotional connotation –which the dancer is invited to assimilate
into their movement solution. This is a relatively simple task for McGregor to
ask the dancers to do – but it still requires a number of unusual decisions to be
made. It was also a task that was invented for the purpose of conducting the
data collection for the first experiment reported on in this paper. Under normal
creation conditions tasks are derived from the space of conceptual inspiration
McGregor is working in for a particular choreography.
Other choreographers have developed methods for directly engaging the
embodied mind of the dancer. William Forsythe’s Improvisation Technologies (see
Forsythe 1999) were described by Dana Caspersen, a performer with Forsythe,
as ‘tools for the playful mind, not laws or some kind of choreographic machinery’
(Caspersen, 2007). Such tools are ‘useful in that they tend to promote an
inventive curiosity’ and encourage ‘the dancer’s mind to consider the vast
number of states and organisations that the human body has to offer.’ These
tools are doing the same thing that McGreogor’s tasks seek to do. Another
example of this form of choreographic practice is Trisha Brown’s 1975 work
Locus, in which the dancer ’envisions the space around the body as a cube defining
the choreography’s architecture’ (Brown and Rosenberg, 2009) as a means of
generating new movements.
While movement creation is of strong interest to the choreographers so
far mentioned, the use of other forms of mental imagery related to sensation,
space, meaning and emotion is also widespread. This wider usage of imagery has
been inferred from informal interviews with choreographers (e.g. Butterworth &
Clarke 1998) and can also be found in reports of many specific practices used
in the dance community, particularly in the field of somatics (e.g. the Skinner
Releasing Technique, Anderson 2006) and in scientific studies of the use of
mental imagery in dance (e.g. Jola & Mast, 2005). It is important to note that
we are not discussing the question of whether task-based creation produces more
aesthetically relevant material. We simply seek to describe the components of a
part of McGregor’s creation process and to provide some systematic evidence
on the use of imagery in dance and movement creation. The intention of our
research is to record dancers’ awareness of their use of these forms of imagery
during movement creation, and to relate these measures to evidence of patterns
of brain activity from neuroimaging studies.
In our first experiment, we used experience sampling methods with the
full company of Wayne McGregor | Random Dance to describe what the
dancers report thinking about while creating movement, how the dancers vary
one from another, and to establish how their experiences change as a function
of different task conditions. In particular, we contrast a conventional ‘active’
condition (where dancers are free to move around) with a ‘static’ condition
(where they have to create movement mentally, without moving), because all
neuroimaging studies require participants to lie motionless within a scanner:
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this is an obvious problem for neuroscientific studies of behaviours that usually
involve movement, such as dance. To date, we do not know how the position and
activity of the participant in neuroimaging studies affects the mental processes
and neural activity involved in movement creation.
In our second experiment, we recorded the brain activity of an experienced
dancer from Wayne McGregor | Random Dance while mentally undertaking
movement creation tasks similar to those used in our experience sampling
experiment to open up debate concerning the extent to which fMRI data might
act as a useful source of validation for otherwise purely subjective reports. Both
studies involved imagery tasks of a primarily spatial-praxic nature (meaning
an imagined object or volume that could be approached and manipulated)
and imagery that focuses on content invoking emotion and socio-personal
narratives.
This is our most ambitious attempt to date to fully report on the
interdisciplinary research work that straddles the disciplines of dance and science,
bringing together authors from different research backgrounds. The background
theory to this study can be found in the Interacting Cognitive Subsystems model
of cognition (e.g., Barnard 1985; Barnard et al., 2007), especially the specific
ideas about different forms of mental representation or imagery.
Unlike Noland’s third-person observations of Cunningham, we interact
directly with McGregor and the dancers as participants in experiments designed
to help us (as scientists) and them (as dance practitioners) better understand
innovative movement creation. Our goal is to develop tools that will enhance the
practice of choreography by bringing scientific findings back to the studio in ways
that can be used by McGregor and his dancers. This paper describes some of the
scientific methods and results that have informed the initial development of some
prototype tools and processes currently referred to in the studio as Choreographic
Thinking Tools. These are notebooks containing prompts and notational devices
that dancers can complete in the studio to aid reflection and awareness of the
mental strategies that they are using.
EXPERIMENT 1: EXPERIENCE SAMPLING IN THE STUDIO
Experience sampling has a long and sometimes controversial history in
psychology, but has recently seen a resurgence of popularity. Experience
Sampling Methodology is a family of empirical methods that allow researchers
to obtain measurements of an individual’s account of their internal mental
events outside artificial laboratory settings and within the context of their normal
everyday settings. In general, these methods involve interrupting an individual
while they are going about an activity in its normal setting and asking them
to make brief subjective reports about their current subjective state, via brief
notes or rating scales. By probing immediate self-report of inner experience,
this method enables researchers to measure a person’s momentary thoughts,
feelings and action-tendencies than by asking through more retrospective recall
methods (for more detail see Feldman, Barrett & Barrett, 2001; Myin-Germeys
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et al., 2009; Smyth et al., 2001; Stone & Shiffman, 1994). This approach was
employed in this experiment to assess momentary internal experience of each of
the imagery components of interest.
The objective of our first experiment was to explore what contributed to
dancers’ thought patterns while creating movement in response to tasks set them
by McGregor, and how changes in the nature of the task and the mode of
creation affected these patterns of thought. We used two forms of task instruction,
based on characteristic tasks that we had observed McGregor use previously.
One task condition was based upon spatial-praxic imagery: one of the actual
tasks used in this experiment was ‘Imagine an object. Reduce it to a line drawing.
Visualise an element of it. Describe what is visible’. The other condition was
based upon emotional instructions: one example from this experiment being
‘Think of a familiar song or piece of music. Focus on the memories, feelings
or sensation it evokes, in you or someone else. Translate it into 3d and draw the
meaning.’
As its name implies, the spatial-praxic task might be expected to draw
primarily upon imagining physical objects and actions in a spatial frame of
reference. The emotional task, in contrast, might be expected to draw upon
deeper and more elaborate conceptual and schematic knowledge including
narrative and interpersonal elements that are rooted in meanings. This might
include the connotations of movements and how another person might relate or
react to them. Our expectation was that these two forms of task instruction would
lead to systematic differences in the nature of the mental imagery reported by
dancers.
As an additional contrast, our experiential measures were collected from
dancers completing choreography tasks in the studio in a conventional, physically
active condition. However, as preparation for our second brain scanning
experiment, where movement is not possible, we also employed a static
condition, where dancers carried out the same kinds of tasks but simulated
movement creation mentally rather than physically, while knowing that they
would enact the movements at the end of the creation period. These contrasts
between active and static creation should enable us to detect any major
differences in strategy that result. We also wanted to find out how these ratings
collected during task execution compared with the dancers’ general prior beliefs
about their ‘typical’ experience of movement creation and so a pre-test was
included for one of our methods to enable us to assess this issue.
Excerpts from the documentary ‘Wayne McGregor, going somewhere’ are
shown in Video 1–3 to illustrate aspects of the experimental procedure for
Experiment 1.
Video Clips from Experiment 1: Extracts from the creative documentary
‘Wayne McGregor, going somewhere’ by Catherine Maximoff, produced
by lesfilmsduprésent – 2011. <http://www.lesfilmsdupresent.fr/2011/wayne-
mcgregor-–-going-somewhere/>
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Video 1. (maximoff clip 1 512.m4v). Wayne McGregor instructs the company with a
spatialpraxic task which they then use to create movement in the static mode, while
periodically being asked to complete the rating scales (7.2 Mb, 1m 40s).
Video 2. (maximoff clip 2 512.m4v). While actively creating movement, the dancers are
asked to stop moving to complete some rating scales. The clip then shows them performing
the pieces created. (8.3Mb, 1m 55s).
Video 3. (maximoff clip 3 512.m4v). In the debriefing session, the dancers explain how they
felt about the day’s tasks (9.5 Mb 2m 40s).
PARTICIPANTS
Eight professional members of Random Dance took part in the experiment (four
male, four female; ages ranging from 24 to 32 years). The dancers had all been
members of Random Dance for at least two years (one had been a member for
three years and another for five years), and so were used to working together as
a group under the direction of Wayne McGregor. They took part as a group,
in a rehearsal space in London, with all instructions being given by Wayne
McGregor.
METHOD
Ethical approval for this experiment was granted by the University of Plymouth
Faculty of Science. All participants gave written informed consent following a
briefing session, in which they were given written and verbal information about
the experiment. During this session, we explained to the dancers what we meant
by mental imagery, and explained the idea that imagery could take different
representational forms. We also explained that you could have several things
going on in mind at once, but would be focally aware of just one form of
representation at any one time, with others seeming to be in the background,
ready for you to bring them into focal awareness. We were careful not to discuss
any expectation that the tasks and modes of movement creation would change
the forms of imagery that they used.
Testing took place over two days. On the first day, dancers completed
the Experience and Imagery Scales (EIS), and on the second, the Thought
Monitoring exercises. The EIS is a conventional retrospective report, used here
mainly over a short immediately preceding period, and was aimed at capturing
an overall characterization of the dancers’ experience of creating movement and
reflecting upon their beliefs about that experience looking back several minutes.
The Thought Monitoring exercise attempts to capture more precisely the type of
image in mind at any one moment in time. At the end of the second day, dancers
were debriefed and took part in a group discussion about their impressions of the
experiment.
On each day, the dancers completed four movement creation exercises
each of approximately half-hour duration, two following spatial-praxic task
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Table 1. Design of Experiment One. Dancers were divided into two groups to balance order
of task instructions. Group A completed spatial-praxic tasks (S-P) followed by emotional
tasks (Emo); Group B completed emotional followed by spatial-praxic tasks. EIS: Experience
and Imagery Scales.
Day One: EIS scales min measures A B
Typical Ratings 10
Active Task 36 Practice scales after 4min S-P Emo
EIS :12, 20, 28 and 36mins
Static Task 32 EIS : 8, 16, 24 and 32min S-P Emo
Rehearse Static piece 5
Perform Static piece 5
rest break 20
Active Task 32 EIS : 8, 16, 24 and 32min Emo S-P
Static Task 32 EIS : 8, 16, 24 and 32min Emo S-P
Rehearse Static piece 5
Perform Static piece 5
Day Two: Thought Probes
Active Task 40 Practice probes: 5, 10mins S-P Emo
Probes: 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40min
Static Task 30 Probes: 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30min S-P Emo
Rehearse Static piece 5
Perform Static piece 5
rest break 20
Active Task 30 Probes: 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30min Emo S-P
Static Task 30 Probes: 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30min Emo S-P
Rehearse Static piece 5
Perform Static piece 5
instructions and two following emotional task instructions. Four dancers
completed the spatial-praxic exercises first, and four the emotional, taking a
twenty minute break between the pairs. The first of each pair of exercises was
made actively, with dancers moving around the space as they normally would
when creating movement, but the second was static, with dancers mentally
creating movement while lying still in a comfortable position on the floor, only
enacting the movement at the end of the exercise (see Table 1 for a timeline of
this experiment).
The EIS were presented as a single A4 sheet containing 21 statements
about different aspects of the dancers’ mental experience and imagery during
movement creation, presented using visual analogue scales (See Supporting
Material S1). The text for each statement was centred above a 100mm line,
and instructions at the top of the sheet asked dancers to make a mark anywhere
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on the line to indicate their experience, with textual anchors (such as ‘Never’
to ‘Most of the time’) being printed at either end of each line. On the front of
the sheet, the first two items (labeled ‘stuff out there’) assessed whether dancers
had been concentrating on events in the room rather than their own mental
imagery, and if they had been distracted whether it was by sounds or sights.
The next nine statements on the first page all assessed the degree that dancers
were aware of using different levels of mental representation, and short labels
were printed to the left of items: intuition (three items), body sensation, spatial-
praxis, emotions, verbal thoughts, propositions, and limb/muscle urge. Another
ten statements were printed on the other side of the sheet, and asked dancers to
rate different aspects of their mental imagery. A free text box was included at the
bottom of each side to allow dancers to note down anything else that they felt
was important.
Before the first exercise, dancers completed the EIS to reflect their beliefs
about their general or typical experience of movement creation. McGregor
himself then verbally gave each group of four dancers the instructions for their
first active exercise and they began creating movement. After four minutes, they
were asked to stop and to complete the scales, based upon the exercise so far. This
served as a practice set. When they had completed the scales, they were asked
to continue with the exercise. They completed four further sets of scales, cued at
eight minute intervals by the experimenter. The same procedure was followed
for the remaining three exercises, except that no practice set was given, and so
only four sets of scales were completed in each of these exercises. For the static
movement creation exercises, the dancers lay on the floor after the instructions
had been given, and remained motionless while mentally creating, only moving
to complete the scales when prompted. At the end of the static exercises, dancers
were given five minutes to actively rehearse the piece they had constructed, and
then performed it while being filmed.
For each participant, the four sets of ratings collected during an exercise
were used to obtain a mean rating for each of the 21 scale items for that exercise.
On the second day, dancers completed a similar sequence of four exercises,
again balancing order of spatial-praxic and emotional instructions. During these
exercises they were asked to stop and write down what they had been thinking
immediately before they had been stopped, using one or two words, such that
they would be able to remember and describe it after the task: the purpose of
this was to focus them upon the thoughts that were at the forefront of their mind,
so that they could then classify the content of these thoughts using the same
eight categories used as experiential labels on the EIS. These categorisations were
the measure we sought for analysis; the actual notes were too fragmentary and
idiosyncratic to support analysis by anyone other than the notemaker.
During the first exercise, they were stopped eight times, at five minute
intervals, with the first two stops serving as practice in recording their thoughts.
During the other three exercises, they were stopped six times. As on day
one, dancers rehearsed and performed their pieces after each of the static
exercises.
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Figure 1. Mean ratings for dancers’ ‘typical experience’ of creating movement (grey bars,
showing mean +/− one standard error), and their ratings while completing the four exercises
(means and standard errors). Solid symbols indicate active tasks; empty symbols the static
tasks; circles indicate spatial-praxic tasks and diamonds the emotional tasks. If a point is
below the grey bar, then it is being experienced less than the dancers’ typical experience.
If it is above the grey bar, then it is being experienced more than typical.
RESULTS
Experience and Imagery Scales
The mean ratings that dancers gave on the 21 EIS scales to describe their typical
experience of movement creation varied between 30 and 77, with standard errors
between between 4.1 and 12. Figure 1 shows these means, plus or minus one
standard error, as wide grey bars. The spread of the error bar for each mean
indicates the degree of consistency between dancers’ ratings: a small bar indicates
similar ratings, while a large bar indicates a wide spread of ratings.
The first two items indicated that dancers felt that they were not often
influenced by events in their environment when creating movement (M =30),
but that when they were those events were just as likely to be sights as sounds
(M =43). Two-tailed one sample t tests showed that the first of these values
differed from the midpoint of 50 (t(7) =3.38, p = .012). but the second did not
(t(7)=0.91, p= .394) – comparing the scale means against the midpoint allows
us to infer whether the dancers were endorsing a statement (where M>50) or
rejecting it (where M<50). A statement with a mean that is not statistically
different to the midpoint is neither clearly endorsed, nor rejected. On this basis,
their scores were around the midpoint when asked if their movements were often
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intuitive (M =46, t(7)= .038, p= .712), whether these intuitions were unguided
or guided by a latent plan (M =63, t(7)=1.04, p= .331) and were equally often
emotional as not emotional (M =53, t(7)=0.34, p= .742).
Of the items addressing dancers’ mental focus while creating movement,
the highest rating was given to spatial-praxis (M =76, t(7)=6.2, p< .001),
followed by limb/muscle (M =68, t(7)=2.01, p= .084), propositions (M =63,
t(7)=1.29, p= .239), emotions (M =62, t(7)1.18, p= .278), body sensation (M
=56, t(7)= .74, p= .484) and verbal thoughts (M =55, t(7)= .42, p= .686).
While all of these forms of representation received mean ratings above the
midpoint, only the spatial-praxis measure was significantly different from the
midpoint of the scale.
The imagery items showed that dancers felt that the specific imagery that
they created at the outset remained at the forefront of their minds while creating
movement (M =77, t(7) =5.16, p = .001), and that this imagery guided their
decision making (M =66, t(7) =2.95, p = .021) and senses of meaning linked
to the imagery often came to mind (M =65, t(7) =1.98, p = .089). They were
equivocal about the ease with which they could reconstruct their original imagery
(M=37, t(7)=1.41, p= .201).
When spatial-praxic imagery was involved it was highly vivid (M =74, t(7)
=4.62, p = .002). Their decision making was not typically based upon what
another person might think (M =35, t(7) =3.13, p = .017), nor on how good
a movement felt without reference to other meanings (M =30, t(7) =3.05, p
= .019). Dancers were equivocal about whether spatial-praxic imagery was of
a third person view of themselves (M =40, t(7)=1.32, p= .229), how familiar
movements felt (M =61, t(7)=1.78, p= .118), and how happy they felt with
their decisions (M =50, t(7)= .01, p= .989).
The general pattern here is that dancers believe themselves to be
creating movement intuitively to some intended plan of which they are not
completely aware, using spatial-praxic, limb/muscle and abstract propositional
imagery based on an initial idea throughout the exercise, recruiting component
movements with which they are familiar. Of course the dancers often differed
substantially in their typical ratings and so these means are only indicative.
Of further interest is how each dancer’s ratings differed when they were
made in response to actual experiences during the four exercises. These means
ratings are shown in Figure 1 as the circles (spatial-praxic task) and diamonds
(emotional task), with filled symbols indicating the tasks competed while actively
moving, and the empty symbols those completed mentally, while lying static
on the floor. To see if the two tasks and modes of creation changed the
ratings in different ways, we used SPSS 18 to carry out separate repeated
measures ANOVAs for each scale with the within-subject factors of Task
(spatialpraxic v. emotional) and Mode (static v. active). Statistically significant
effects were found for eight of the scales, and (given the low power of the
Experiment, with only eight dancers) non-significant F values with effect sizes
> .10 for another nine. The results of the ANOVAs are summarised in
Table 2.
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Table 2. Summary of ANOVA results from Experiment One. All effects where partial 2 > .10
are listed; ns indicates p> .05. Partial 2 is a measure of effect size: Cohen (1988, p. 283)
suggests that .01 is a small effect, .06 a medium effect, and .14 a large effect.
Task Mode Task x Mode
F (1,7) p; partial 2 F (1,7) p; partial 2 F (1,7) p; partial 2
Scale
Stuff out there – – –
— Sounds/sights 6.91 .034; .50 11.92 .011; .63 –
Intuition 8.24 .024; .54 1.40 ns; .17 1.47 ns; .17
— Spontaneous/guided – – 1.86 ns; .22
— Emotional/not emotional 5.65 .049; .45 – 10.18 .015; .59
Body Sensation – 2.07 ns; .23 1.16 ns; .14
Spatialpraxis – – 2.76 ns; .28
Emotions – – 22.23 .002; .76
Verbal thoughts – – –
Propositions – 2.28 ns; .25 –
Limb/Muscle Urge – – –
Use of Imagery
Imagery forefront – – 1.42 ns; .17
Reconstruct imagery – 6.42 .039; .48 1.06 ns; .34
— Spatiopraxic vividness 1.20 ns; .15 – 1.42 ns; .17
—Third person – 3.07 ns; .31 –
Senses of meaning 2.90 ns; .29 – 1.11 ns; .14
Familiar movement 4.21 ns; .38 – 1.25 ns; .30
Decisions
original imagery 7.53 .029; .52 – 1.50 ns; .26
feel good 5.74 .048; .45 – 5.87 .046; .46
other thinks – – –
happy 1.86 ns; .21 9.25 .019; .57 2.63 ns; .27
The dancers were focused on mental imagery equally in all four tasks,
with ratings very similar to their typical experience. When they were distracted,
however, the effect of Mode that is listed in Table 2 shows that they were much
more likely to be distracted by sounds than sights during the static exercise, when
they were lying on the floor, with their eyes closed. This is not too surprising;
but the effect of Task in Table 2 shows that they were also less distracted by
sights during the emotional tasks (in Figure 1, the diamonds are lower than
the circles). The absence of an interaction between Task and Mode shows
that the effect of the emotional task was the same in both static and active
modes.
The degree to which dancers felt they were moving intuitively was also
affected by the task, with the emotional task being more intuitive than the spatial-
praxic task. From the means in Figure 1, it would seem as if this effect is bigger
for the active mode, but this interaction was not statistically significant. When
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they were moving intuitively, there were no differences in the ratings for whether
the movement felt spontaneous or guided by some plan, but the movements felt
more emotional in the active emotional task, and less emotional in the active
spatial-praxic task – hence the significant interaction in Table 2.
Turning to the dancers’ awareness of attending to each of the six levels of
mental representation (body to limb/muscle), it is apparent that only one of the
ratings lies above the dancers’ ratings of their typical experience. There were
several noticeable effects of Task and Mode (indicated by the high values of
partial eta-squared in Table 2, which estimates the proportion of variance in
the data attributable to the effect), but due to the small number of dancers in the
company, the low statistical power means that only one of these effects reaches
statistical significance: the interaction of Task and Mode for the awareness of
emotional experiences related to their movement. This indicates that when
dancers were actively moving, the spatial-praxic task made them less aware of
their emotional experiences; but when they were mentally creating movement
while static, the emotional task made them less aware of emotional experiences.
(This will be discussed further below.)
Of the non-significant effects, the largest is the interaction of Task andMode
for awareness of spatial-praxic thought: ‘visual-like images in my mind’s eye.’ All
four exercises produced ratings that were lower than dancers’ typical experience,
but lowest was the active emotional task, followed by the static spatial-praxic task.
The dancers’ ratings for the use of imagery in their creative work and
decision making showed that the static mode made it harder to bring to mind
and reconstruct their original imagery while developing movements (this is the
effect of Mode in Table 2; this scale ran from ‘very little effort’ at zero to ‘a great
deal of effort’ at 100).
Dancers based decisions about their movements upon their initial imagery
more often during the spatial-praxic task than the emotional task. In the static
mode, they were more likely to base decision upon how good a movement would
feel for the spatial-praxic task, and less likely to do so for the emotional task,
compared to active mode, where both tasks produced ratings similar to the
typical experience.
Finally, in response to the question ‘How many of your decisions are you
happy with?, the dancers were clearly unhappier with decisions made in the
unfamiliar static mode than with the familiar active mode. The fact that the
dancers were not happy with how they responded to the tasks when asked
to complete them without moving emphasizes that their normal method of
movement creation involves a wide range of embodied activity that is not
available when they are asked to lie motionless, as in neuroimaging studies.
THOUGHT PROBES
The six thoughts probed from the eight dancers during each of the four
exercises on day two were pooled (a total of 186 thoughts, since six thoughts
were uncategorized), the number allocated by the dancers to each category
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Figure 2. Overall Proportion of thoughts probed by category. Verbal thoughts are most
frequent; intuition, proposition, emotion and limb/muscle thoughts rarest.
counted up, and divided by the total to give a proportion (Figure 2). Overall
the highest proportion were verbal thoughts (22%), followed by bodily sensations
(17%), spatial-praxic thoughts (16%) and thoughts about events happening in
the rehearsal space (such as the music being played, other dancers’ proximity,
or people walking around; 13%). These three categories together accounted for
over two-thirds of thoughts (N =127). Dancers very rarely categorized their
thoughts as ‘intuitive’, at only 6% (N =12) overall.
When the proportions of thoughts in each category reported for the
four exercises are compared (Figure 3), differences between the two modes
of movement creation and the two tasks are apparent. For both tasks, the
static mode resulted in a decrease in propositional conceptualization and bodily
sensation; but while the spatial-praxic task led to fewer verbal thoughts and more
emotional, spatial-praxic, and limb/muscle planning thoughts, the Emotional
task showed the opposite pattern. The emotional task also produced more
thoughts about events in the external space in the static condition than the
active.
The small number of dancers, and the non-independence of the six
thoughts per dancer, mean that there is no practical way of testing for statistical
significance in these patterns of thought content, but the differences observed do
make some intuitive sense. The static exercise does not offer much opportunity
for the use of bodily sensations, and there is a clear shift away from abstract
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Figure 3. Compared to active movement creation (grey lines), in static movement creation
(black lines), the spatial-praxic task (left diagram) showed fewer verbal thoughts,
propositional conceptualisation and bodily sensations, and more spatial-praxic and
emotional thoughts. The emotional task (right diagram) also showed less propositional
conceptualisation, together with less limb/muscle planning, but more verbal thoughts and
awareness of events in external space.
December 9, 2011 Time: 07:21pm drs.2011.0026.tex
POINTS IN MENTAL SPACE 417
propositional conceptualisation. For the spatial-praxic task, there is a shift
towards planning limb/muscle actions, with more spatial-praxic and emotional
thoughts in the static than the active conditions. In the emotional task, however,
there is less limb/muscle planning and more verbal thoughts, as well as a
tendency to be distracted more by events happening in the studio in the static
condition.
DISCUSSION
The largest, and least surprising, difference between the experiential and the
typical ratings shown in Figure 1 is that dancers were less influenced by
sights in the static exercises, when they were lying on the floor with their
eyes closed, although the thought monitoring data shows that they were still
distracted by events, especially during the emotional task. This is helpful in
giving some face validity to the rating methodology. Dancers were also less
happy about their decisions in the unfamiliar static condition. Beyond this, there
are some interesting differences in the extent to which dancers feel that they
are relying upon intuition, the role of emotional experience in their movement
creation, and the reliance upon some form of imagery from the outset of each
exercise.
The active exercises were more like the dancers’ usual style of movement
creation, and yet the filled symbols in Figure 1 show that their actual experience
often differed from their expectations about what would be typical for them.
In contrast to their typical ratings, they felt that they were making more use
of intuition in the emotional task; for the active spatial-praxic task they felt less
aware of emotional experiences related to their movements and their intuitions
were less emotional. This is unlikely to be a contrast effect from the emotional
task, because of the counterbalancing: four dancers had not yet experienced the
emotional task when rating the spatial-praxic task. Interestingly, in the thought
probe data they also reported fewer emotional thoughts in the active than in the
static mode.
Compared to the rating scales, the thought monitoring data shows a
different pattern for use of intuition, with thoughts rarely identified as intuitive.
This may simply be because when asked about a thought at the moment it
is happening, its precursors are more apparent, and so you are less likely to
identify it as spontaneous. Similarly, while dancers used the rating scales to
indicate that their typical experience would involve limb/muscle planning and
few verbal thoughts, the thought monitoring showed verbal thoughts to be the
most frequent category, with limb/muscle planning one of the rarer types: the
dancers’ awareness was focused more than they anticipated upon conceptual
than physical or bodily aspects. The thought monitoring and experiential results
could differ for a number of reasons: the rating scales are obviously subjective and
retrospective, whereas the thought monitoring attempts to objectively sample
specific thoughts at a discrete moment. However, only six probes were possible
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in each of the four sessions, and so the granularity of the monitoring is large: it
would be easy for thoughts of a specific form to have occurred briefly and not to
have been caught by a probe. What the thought monitoring really gives us is an
indication of the amount of time spent thinking in a particular way, rather than
the importance of that form of thinking. It is more helpful to compare the two
forms of measurement across the tasks and modes, than to compare them with
each other within a task or mode.
When dancers were asked to create movement mentally, without moving,
there were clear differences in their experiential ratings. Compared to their
typical ratings, they made less use of emotional experiences when they were
completing the emotional task, and in both tasks they felt it harder to reconstruct
their original imagery. In the more conventional active condition, they made less
use of their imagery than typical in the emotional task, but more in the spatial-
praxic task. Overall, compared to their typical ratings, dancers reported that they
based their decisions about movement more often upon how good it felt as a part
of a phrase.
Importantly for the development of practical Choreographic Thinking Tools
to support movement innovation, post-task debriefing also indicated that the
very act of reflecting on, and categorizing, their experiences provided the
dancers with insights about their mental habits during innovative movement
creation. Such insights provide conditions under which habits can be recognised
and then altered to adopt alternative points in mental space from which to
create movement material. Providing the dancers and McGregor with a means
to communicate more productively about the properties of the task-based
instructions has been acknowledged by the company to be of clear benefit and a
useful addition to their working process.
EXPERIMENT 2: BRAIN ACTIVITY DURING CHOREOGRAPHIC
THINKING
Mental Imagery has been extensively investigated both in cognitive and
neuroscience laboratories (Kosslyn, Ganis & Thompson, 2009) and in applied
settings, for example to improve performance in competitive sports (Murphy,
1990). Studies of internal mental states such as imagery are controversial
precisely because they have long been seen as subjective, and not open to
objective quantification. Modern brain scanning techniques offer the prospect of
providing collateral evidence for the involvement of different forms of imagery,
since they enable us to test whether activity in function-specific brain regions
known to be involved in, for example, visuo-spatial experiences, motor control
or decision making is correlated with subjective reports of the use of that imagery.
Owen & Coleman (2008), for example, used the detection of neural activity
associated with different forms of imagined activity (playing tennis, or walking
around one’s home) to show that a patient in a vegetative state, who could
not respond physically, could respond mentally to oral instructions. Moreover,
several studies have examined the brain activity of creative artists (Bhattacharya
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& Petsche, 2005; Berkowitz & Ansari, 2008), including studies of improvisation
in dance (e.g. Fink, Graif & Neubauer, 2009), and data obtained in this way offers
the prospect of investigating the neural underpinnings of choreographic practice.
Cognitive neuroscience research has also investigated the neural
mechanisms of motor imagery in the control of action (e.g. see deLange, Roelofs
& Toni, 2008). In the same way that visual imagery and visual perception
recruit similar brain regions (Ganis et al., 2004), several studies have shown that
during imagination of a movement, the same sensorimotor regions are activated
as when we observe a movement or actually execute it ourselves (Decety et
al., 1994; Grèzes & Decety, 2001). Some studies have made use of the motor
expertise model to investigate the link between the action execution and action
perception network (Calvo-Merino et al., 2005; Calvo-Merino et al., 2006; Orgs
et al., 2008) and motor learning (Cross et al. 2006). Other studies have focused
on the underlying neural mechanisms of creativity in realms other than dance
(Jung et al., 2010), especially in music (Limb and Braun, 2008) and drawing
(Bhattacharya & Petsche, 2005). The bulk of these studies have been based upon
the researchers’ expectations concerning motor responses, rather than seeking
to correlate activity with subjective reports of motor imagery, so while they have
focused uponmotor or movement related brain processes, wide ranging networks
are implicated and the possible involvement of multiple forms of imagery in such
tasks remains to be clarified.
To obtain evidence on the use of mental imagery in dance and creativity
tasks, we set out to pilot with a single participant, the use of fMRI data to
investigate the neural circuitry implicated in choreographing movement tasks.
We have data from Experiment 1 indicating that changing the focus of the task
from spatial-praxic to emotional representations changes the forms of imagery
that dancers are aware of using in their movement creation. These changes
do not always correspond with what one might expect if the changes were
just due to demand effects, which would lead to the dancers reports reflecting
their expectations about the needs of the tasks, and as with any self-report data,
objective cross-validation would be helpful. A single case-study is useful here to
show that it is possible to identify different patterns of brain activity with tasks
that require or involve different forms of mental imagery. If successful, this would
support future work with larger numbers of volunteers to validate if there is a
general pattern across individuals in different forms of imagery.
In this pilot experiment, we again used spatial-praxic and emotional task
instructions. As it is not possible to execute whole body movements in a brain
scanner while recording the brain activity, we adapted the static mode from
Experiment 1 for the neuroimaging session. For each task we used two phases: in
a first phase our dancer was asked just to create imagery to meet the requirements
of the instructions, without imagining movement; and in a second phase she was
asked to create movement mentally, based upon that imagery. This approach
enables us to identify any differences between two hypothetical aspects of
choreographic thinking: the creation of imagery used for choreography, and the
mental movement creation.
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These two phases do not compare visual imagery with motor imagery,
since each (along with other forms of imagery) may be involved in both phases;
rather it is to discover which forms of imagery the dancer used in each phase.
Of course, breaking the task down into these two phases makes it less like the
dancer’s normal practice, in which imagery creation and movement creation are
intertwined, and it may be difficult for a dancer to execute each phase separately:
among other things, this pilot sought to show that an expert dancer could in fact
meet these unusual task requirements.
METHOD
We used fMRI to record brain activity of a right handed female (age =39),
who was an experienced dancer with 12 years experience with the tasks used by
Wayne McGregor | Random Dance. Ethical approval for this experiment was
granted by Cambridge Psychology Research Ethics Committee.
The scanning session included a block-design with three non-dance imagery
reference tasks, and four dance-related experimental tasks (see Figure 4). We used
the reference tasks to familiarise the dancer with the basic procedure (imagining
playing tennis for motor imagery; imagining navigating around their home for
spatial-praxic imagery, and a guided body scan for somatic imagery). The brain
activations related to these tasks have been previously described (Boly, Coleman,
Davis et al., 2007), therefore they are used as reference to identify brain regions
related to motor and spatial imagery, and embodiment.
As in Experiment 1, spatial-praxic and emotional task instructions were
used, but they were now further divided into two phases: first an imagery creation
phase, followed by a movement creation phase. Two runs of the spatial-praxic
tasks were conducted first, followed by two runs of the emotional tasks. Detailed
task instructions concerning all tasks to be performed were given prior to entering
the scanner, but to avoid the dancer creating imagery before scanning started,
she was given six possible scenarios, and not told which to develop until scanning
started. Since she was highly experienced, our instructions simply indicated the
type and broad content of the task, leaving open those areas for task ambiguity
and decision-making described in the introduction. In the spatial-praxic tasks,
the dancer was asked to ‘Imagine an abstract 3D volume in space such as a
cube – it might or might not have specific properties like texture’, and in the
emotional tasks ‘the personal characteristics of someone you know or know about
reasonably well; might be a friend, relative, colleague or a public figure andmight
relate to how they move; if they are old or young, how they interact with others,
express themselves emotionally.’ Each imagery and movement creation phase
lasted 5 minutes during which we alternated 30 seconds of the experimental
task with 30 seconds of a control task (focusing on one’s own breath), with the
beginning of each 30 second block indicated to the dancer by an appropriate
verbal cue i.e., ‘3D volume’ and ‘familiar person’ for the imagery creation phases,
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Figure 4. Design of Experiment 2: For each of the three reference tasks, the dancer
completed five 30s blocks of imagery creation, alternating with 30s of the control breath
focus task. For the dance related tasks, the dancer completed five 30s blocks of imagery
creation alternating with breath focus, followed by five 30s blocks of movement creation,
also alternating with breath focus.
‘develop ideas’ for the movement creation phases, and ‘focus on breathing’ for
the control task phases.
The entire scanning session lasted 1.5 hours. Following the scanning itself
the dancer was extensively questioned about the nature of imagery constructed
as well as nature of the phrases developed.
DATA ACQUISITION AND IMAGE ANALYSIS
A 3TTIMTrio System (Siemens, Erlangen, Germany) was used to acquire echo-
planar functional images (TR=2.0 s, TE=30 ms, FA=78◦, matrix size 64×64,
32 slices each with a 25% gap, giving a voxel size of 3×3×3.75 mm, 11 sessions of
160 volumes). A T1-weighted MPRAGE anatomical volume used 1 mm3 voxels
(flip angle=9◦ ; TE=2.00 sec; GRAPPA acceleration factor =2). Parameters
were set to follow Boly et al. (2007) in order to be able to compare similarities in
the reference non-dance tasks.
Data were analysed using the SPM5 software (www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm).
The first 10 volumes in each session were discarded to allow for T1
equilibrium. Standard spatial preprocessing comprised realignment to correct for
head movement, rigid-body co-registration with the dancer’s structural image,
nonlinear normalization to the MNI T1-weighted template (2-mm isotropic
voxels), and finally, smoothing with a Gaussian kernel of 8 mm FWHM. Raw
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images and the pattern of activation did not show artefacts that could be related
to movement. For each session, events were modeled by convolving onset times
with a canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF). Contrasts for each
experimental condition were computed using a General Linear model (GLM).
The aim of the non-dance reference task was to familiarize the dancer
with the procedure and to confirm that the dancer’s brain responses related
to imagery. Our a priori anatomical hypothesis was based on previous studies
using similar tasks. We used a 10-mm radius sphere small volume corrected
(SVC) p<0.05 on previously documented coordinates from motor imagery
and spatial navigation tasks (Boly et al., 2007). For the dance tasks, we also
used a small volume correction (with a sphere of 10mm radius) for areas in
the action observation literature about which we had an a priori anatomical
hypothesis. Significant activations outside predicted areas are reported at a
corrected significance level of p<0.05 after correcting for multiple comparisons
over the whole brain to control the familywise error rate (FEW), with a cluster
threshold of 20 voxels.
RESULTS
On the basis of the post-scan debriefing we established the nature of the images
generated in response to the spatial-praxic and emotional instructions and
established some broad properties of how movement material that made up
the phrases was created and developed. In both the imagery creation phases
and static movement creation phases, quite varied and intricate strategies were
involved, revealing a number of challenges both for analysis and interpretation.
Our design involved two examples of both the spatial-praxic and emotional tasks
and our dancer adopted different strategies for mentally creating movement
material for the two examples: she imagined a huge intricate volume space and
a simple cylinder in the two spatial-praxic tasks; in the two emotional tasks she
used visual images of different personally significant people; and in the static
movement creation phase she rehearsed the material she had created and then
added new elements to the end of that sequence, rehearsed and added again
and in this way accumulated material to form a practiced phrase. In one run
of the emotional task she adopted a first-person perspective, and in the other
run, a third-person perspective. For one run of the spatial-praxic task, she
choreographed a solo, in the other run, a duet. This gross variation in cognitive
activity between the two runs of each task means that it was not possible to
contrast the spatial-praxic and emotional movement creation tasks directly. Our
analysis therefore followed three major pathways.
First, we analysed the three non-dance reference tasks to establish
consistency with prior research on motor and spatial-praxic imagery (Boly et al.,
2007). Second, we examined the pattern of activity involved in each imagery
creation and static movement creation task compared to its concurrent control
condition (breath focus), to illustrate the extensive brain networks involved in
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tasks such as this with intricate and varied demands, and also to allow for
comparison with other fMRI work with dancers. Finally, we compared imagery
creation with static movement creation tasks.
Spatial navigation (navigating around one’s home) activated left pre-
supplementary motor area (pre-SMA), supplementary motor area (SMA) and
bilateral dorsal premotor cortex (dPMc), parahippocampal cortex, retrosplenial
cortex, occipito-parietal junction and precuneus. Motor imagery (playing tennis)
activated bilateral pre-SMA, SMA, dPMC, and inferior parietal lobe in the right
hemisphere (see complete list of activations in Supporting Material S2). Somatic
imagery (body scan) also revealed a clear signature of activity in bilateral somatic
areas along the post central gyrus, however, none of these activations survived
corrections for multiple comparisons, and they will not be discussed further.
These results were consistent with prior research (Boly et al., 2007), indicating
that for this dancer different task instructions did indeed give rise to the expected
patterns of differential activation of relevant brain regions.
The spatial-praxis imagery creation task (compared to the control breath
focus task) showed activations in a set of regions classically described in the action
observation literature (Calvo-Merino et al., 2005). These are the ventral and
dorsal sections of the premotor cortex, and the inferior and superior parietal
lobe. There was also activation in the middle temporal gyrus, close to the
extrastriate body area, and in the orbitofrontal cortex (Figure 5A). These latter
activations were also present in the emotional imagery creation task, along
with weaker activity in the left superior parietal lobe (Figure 5B; a full list of
activations are reported in S3 and S4 of the SupportingMaterial). The emotional
imagery creation was generally stronger in the left hemisphere, and lacked the
motor/action areas apparent in the spatial-praxic imagery creation.
For brain activity related to static movement creation we predicted a
pattern of activation similar to that found in a previous study using whole body
dance observation (Calvo-Merino et al., 2005). Accordingly, we performed a
small volume correction (SVC) for multiple comparisons using 10mm spheres
centred on these areas. We found bilateral activations in dorsal and ventral
premotor cortex, superior parietal lobe, intraparietal sulcus and posterior
superior temporal sulcus (Figure 6A). Finally, we found stronger activity in right
inferior frontal gyrus during the two static movement creation tasks compared
to the two imagery creation tasks (Figure 6B). No activations survived correction
when conducting the opposite contrast (a full list of activations are reported in
S5 of the Supporting Material).
DISCUSSION
This fMRI pilot investigation evaluated the relationship between neural
activations and subjective reports obtained under similar conditions and assessed
the feasibility of studying the neural underpinnings of choreographic practice.
These preliminary results are based on a single subject, therefore caution should
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Figure 5. Brain rendering of areas that showed activity during (A) spatial praxis imagery
creation and (B) emotional imagery creation, both relative to the control breath focus task.
(1a, 1b) bilateral premotor cortex, (2) superior parietal lobe, (3) middle temporal gyrus (4a,
4b) orbitofrontal cortex (p< .0.05, whole brain corrected. Projections of the activation foci
on the surface of standard brain (Montreal Neurological Institute, MNI).
be taken in interpreting and generalising the results. However, the study is based
on a previous paradigm with well-established results that were replicated in
several participants (Boly et al., 2007). In related paradigms single case studies
have pinpointed issues that have proven to be highly significant, as in the report
by Owen, Coleman, Boly, et al., (2006) of patterns of differential brain activation
following requests to imagine playing tennis or navigating around ones home
in a single patient in a vegetative state. The outcome with our dancer confirms
feasibility, but obviously broader extension to population characteristics for the
neural underpinnings of these types of imagery would require follow-up work
with group designs. As noted in the results section, our three non-dance reference
tasks supported the core validity of the overall fMRI procedure with respect
to the involvement of different neural network components for different task
instructions.
Our fMRI data showed that the spatial-praxis and emotional imagery
tasks shared activations in orbitofrontal cortex, middle temporal regions and
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Figure 6. Brain rendering of areas that showed greater activity during static movement
creation relative to (A) control breath focus task and (B) imagery creation task. (1a, 1b)
bilateral premotor cortex, (2) superior parietal lobe, (3) middle temporal gyrus, (4) right
inferior frontal gyrus. (P< .0.05, whole brain corrected. Projections of the activation foci
on the surface of standard brain (Montreal Neurological Institute, MNI).
occipital cortex. The orbitofrontal cortex has often been linked to sensory
integration, in representing the affective value of reinforcers, and in decision-
making and expectation (Kringelbach, 2005). Common brain activations in
middle temporal regions may reflect perceptual expertise responses usually
associated with the nearby extrastriate cortex. This region is thought to hold
a human body representation (Downing et al., 2001) as well as a dynamic
action representation (Downing et al., 2006) that may have contributed to both
imagery creation and static movement creation. Spatial-praxis imagery creation
showed additional activation in the premotor and parietal cortices suggesting that
sensorimotor representations were being used, even though motor behaviour was
not being explicitly imagined. Although based on a single dancer, our results are
nonetheless in broad agreement with previous motor imagery studies (Iacoboni
et al., 1999; Grèzes and Decety, 2001; Calvo-Merino et al., 2005).
The activity related to static movement creation showed a very similar
pattern of activity to the imagery creation tasks, showing how important imagery
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creation is in movement creation. Analysis of the peak coordinates indicated that
brain regions participating here were the same as those in studies where expert
dancers watch familiar dance movements (Calvo-Merino et al., 2005). The
only major difference found between movement creation and imagery creation
was an increased activation of the right inferior frontal gyrus, which has been
associated with representations of goal directed actions in movement observation
and execution (Iacoboni et al., 1999). Moreover, this area has also been related to
inhibition of prepotent responses (Christopoulos, Tobler, Bossaerts et al., 2009),
but also in the multiple-demand network (Duncan, 2010), which is activated by
many different cognitive demands including perceptual difficulty, novelty, and
response conflict. While it is possible that this activity reflects the novelty for our
dancer of creating movement while remaining stationary, and having to inhibit
her own movement, it could also reflect the need to synthesise different and
novel ideas about movement to complete the movement creation task, as the
subjective reports from Experiment 1 suggested. While these data do provide
some general support for the idea that both imagery and movement creation
tasks are grounded in some elements of physical or action based thinking, they
also raise some key questions concerning the wider mental context in which
such thinking occurs and, given the clear limitations of the current fMRI and
experience sampling work, how future research might usefully be directed. The
variety of strategies adopted within each task by our very creative dancer, which
prevented our direct comparison of spatial-praxic and emotional movement
creation tasks, also shows that it is necessary either to impose clearer constraints
upon the experimental tasks (e.g., to adopt a first-person perspective for one’s
own dance, rather than a third-person perspective of other dancers), or if time
and resources allow, to collect data from several runs in order to maximize task
specific variations in relation to general variation in brain activity.
An interesting illustration of how our findings might be further pursued
concerns creativity. The neuroscience literature has given rise to considerable
speculation concerning the role in creativity of the orbitofrontal and dorsolateral
frontal areas implicated here in imagery and movement creation. For example,
Jung et al. (2010) showed that cortical thickness in the left lateral orbitofrontal
cortex correlates with higher creative achievement, while Limb and Braun (2008)
showed a deactivation of dorsolateral frontal regions during jazz improvisation.
The latter finding highlights a potential contrast with our own data that might
be pursued in further research. Our movement creation tasks, as evidenced by
both the experience sampling and fMRI data, appear to have large decision-
making components. In post-task debriefing our dancer noted that the movement
creation phases involved attempting to remember the movement sequence.
In contrast, perhaps jazz or movement improvisation may minimise demands
on memory and decision-making. It would follow that a direct comparison of
dance improvisation and phrase creation in the scanner should show differential
activation of dorsolateral frontal cortex. Such a finding, if realised, would
support task-dependent activation not unlike the task dependence evidenced in
our earlier experience sampling study. Choreographic thinking will quite likely
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depend on a variety of neural components recruited in a task dependent manner
and the exact nature of the dependence is, on the basis of this pilot work, clearly
open to hypothesis development and direct test.
CONCLUSION
Taken together, the two exploratory studies that we present here indicate that
the neural and experiential attributes of imagery associated with movement
creation are open to systematic investigation –movement creation can start from
alternative points in mental space as well as physical space. This enables us
to look forward to establishing with greater precision how tasks that challenge
dancers in different ways may affect mental and neural processes and how
variation in imagery use across dancers might contribute to differences in the
movement that they create. Notably, the act of reflecting on the experience of
movement creation also offers some practical leverage to help dancers develop
a wider range of strategies for innovation. The dancers in Experiment 1 initially
gave high ratings for their use of intuitive feelings to guide their movement
creation, but in practice were able to identify more specific content for their
thoughts, indicating that their movement creation is a skilled and intentional
activity in which they form an idea at the outset and attempt to base their
movement upon this initial representation. Individual dancers varied in the forms
of imagery that they reported: future studies could compare dancers’ preferred
forms of imagery and standard measures of imagery vividness across a variety
of forms of imagery (going beyond conventional measures of visual vs. motor
imagery).
The differences between static and active movement creation found in
Experiment 1 should make researchers cautious about drawing inferences from
fMRI studies such as that reported in Experiment 2, because it is clear that
choreographic movement creation is an embodied cognitive activity, in which
the mind and body interact. Constraining the dancers to remain static changed
the nature of their mental experiences and the content of their thoughts,
making it harder for them to maintain a focus upon their original imagery
and decreasing the amount of abstract propositional conceptualisation. The
thought monitoring showed that the mental consequences of movement creation
while static depended upon the task instructions the dancers were following
(i.e., spatial-praxic or emotional) and so this also needs to be well defined.
Nevertheless, the extensive recruitment of motor and decision making areas
evident in the fMRI data encourages us to conclude that both approaches
can yield valuable insights into the nature of creative choreography. Perhaps
most importantly, our two studies emphasise the need for subjective as well
as objective sources of evidence to be obtained, and for the need to consider
the connections between subjective and objective measurement, as well as what
any patterns that emerge from the comparisons might imply for choreographic
practice.
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Soon after participating in the two exploratory studies, McGregor and
the company spent three weeks in residence at the Experimental Media and
Performing Arts Centre, Troy, NY and the Chicago Dance Center working
on the Choreographic Thinking Tools with the same background theory (ICS,
Barnard 1985; Barnard et al. 2007) and using revised experience sampling and
thought probes as a reflective tool for the dancers. The residency resulted in
a working process the dancers could use to enhance their use of imagery in
movement creation. The basics of this process involve a method of working
with sources of inspiration or stimuli, extracting properties and strategies to
translate these properties into movement material. What this does is free the
individual dancer to make intuitive discoveries of novel movement material, and
to be able to reflect on their process of movement creation. It also develops in
trained dancers the ability to recognize ingrained movement patterns and to
make unusual or perhaps even surprising choices in the creation process.
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